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Preface
Minicomputers are used in many companies to 
automate processing of financial data. An in­
creasing number of auditors are encountering 
the widespread use of minicomputers to pro­
cess financial information.
A u d it  a n d  C o n tro l C o n s id e ra tio n s  in  a M in i­
c o m p u te r  o r  S m a ll B u s in e s s  C o m p u te r  E n v iro n ­
m e n t is intended to be a basic document for 
the minicomputer environment. The reader 
should already have a basic knowledge of 
data processing concepts. Although prepared 
primarily for the independent CPA, this guide­
line can also be useful to internal auditors, EDP 
auditors, data processing managers, and man­
agers of businesses that use minicomputers. 
The purposes of this publication are to define a 
minicomputer environment, to provide the 
reader with an understanding of that environ­
ment, and to offer guidelines for addressing
the audit and control considerations in that en­
vironment.
It may be helpful for the reader to be 
aware of certain other AICPA publications that 
provide basic information on internal controls 
and audit considerations in computer systems. 
These AICPA publications include
•  The A u d ito r ’s S tu d y  a n d  E v a lu a tio n  o f In te r­
n a l C o n tro l in  E D P  S ys te m s  (1977)
•  M a n a g e m e n t, C o n tro l a n d  A u d it o f  A d ­
v a n c e d  E D P  S y s te m s  (1977)
•  A u d it C o n s id e ra t io n s  in  E le c tro n ic  F u n d s  
T ra n s fe r S y s te m s  (1978)
•  C o m p u te r -A s s is te d  A u d it  T e c h n iq u e s  (1979)
•  C o n tro ls  O v e r U s in g  a n d  C h a n g in g  C o m ­
p u te r  P ro g ra m s  (1979)
•  A u d it A p p ro a c h e s  fo r  a C o m p u te r iz e d  In v e n ­
to ry  S ys te m  (1980)
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The Minicomputer 
Environment
The purpose of this guideline is to assist the 
auditor in planning and conducting an audit in 
an environment where a minicomputer is used 
to process significant accounting data. The fol­
lowing specific matters will be addressed:
•  Control-related characteristics of the mini­
computer environment.
•  Risks and controls to reduce these risks.
•  Audit considerations and substantive audit 
techniques.
Characteristics and Definitions
The term m in ic o m p u te r  is often used to de­
scribe a family of computers that includes 
small business computers, microcomputers, 
and intelligent terminals.
The term m in ic o m p u te r  e n v iro n m e n t, as 
used in this document, does not refer to the 
type of hardware used; rather, it refers to the 
organizational and operating characteristics 
commonly associated with a minicomputer. The 
auditor will find this guideline applicable to 
both minicomputer and large-scale computer 
installations that exhibit some of the following 
characteristics:
•  L a c k  o f  s e g re g a t io n  o f  fu n c t io n s  b e tw e e n  the  
E D P  d e p a r tm e n t a n d  u se rs . Personnel in the 
user department initiate and authorize 
source documents, enter data into the sys­
tem, operate the computer, and use the out­
put reports.
•  L o c a tio n  o f  th e  c o m p u te r. The computer is 
generally located in the same area as the 
user department.
•  L a c k  o f  s e g re g a t io n  o f  fu n c tio n s  w ith in  the  
E D P  d e p a rtm e n t. There is a limited number 
of “technical” data processing personnel.
•  L im ite d  k n o w le d g e  o f  EDP. The supervisor 
responsible for data processing has limited 
knowledge of EDP.
In addition, the following characteristics 
are found in many minicomputer environments:
•  U tility  p ro g ra m s . Utility programs are used 
extensively to enter and to change data.
•  D is k e t te s .Diskettes are used extensively for 
file storage.
•  T e rm in a ls . Terminals are used for transaction 
data entry, inquiry, and other interactive 
functions.
•  S o ftw a re  p a c k a g e s . Purchased software 
packages are used extensively rather than 
internally developed application software.
•  D o c u m e n ta tio n . Available system, program, 
operation, and user documentation may be 
limited or nonexistent.
Not all minicomputer installations have 
these characteristics. For example, the mini­
computer may be located in a separate com­
puter room, or it may be operated by data 
processing personnel. In such cases, some of 
the special audit and control considerations 
described in this guideline may not apply.
The minicomputer hardware forms the ba­
sis for other types of environments, including 
multiple independent minicomputers and mini­
computers used for data entry only.
Multiple Computers. The auditor may encoun­
ter organizations with one or more minicompu­
ters in each major department or division.
When the processing performed by any one of 
these minicomputers is independent of that 
performed by another minicomputer, the appli­
cable audit considerations may fall within the 
scope of this guideline. However, when appli­
cation systems require that minicomputers 
communicate with each other or with a host 
computer, the control considerations regarding 
data communications are not covered in this 
guideline.
For example, a large manufacturing com­
pany may have a minicomputer in each of its 
divisions to maintain perpetual inventory rec­
ords. Each division’s minicomputer may trans­
mit inventory balances periodically to a host 
computer located at a central processing facil­
ity. The data communication aspect of such a
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system adds a new dimension that is not ad­
dressed in this document.
Data Entry. Some minicomputers are exclu­
sively used to convert source transactions into 
machine-readable form, thereby replacing key­
punch machines and punched cards. The stor­
age media containing input transactions are 
generally used by another computer to process 
and to update application master files. The 
minicomputer environment in which data entry 
is the only function performed is not covered in 
this guideline.
Comparison of Minicomputers and Larger 
Computers
In many respects a minicomputer is similar to a 
medium- or large-scale computer having disk 
(or diskette) and magnetic tape (or cassette) 
storage devices for recording and maintaining 
transactions, data files, and computer pro­
grams. A minicomputer has a main memory for 
programs to process information and a central 
processing unit (CPU) that executes pro­
grammed instructions. Input transactions are 
usually entered through cathode ray tube 
(CRT) terminals or through off-line data entry 
devices. The processing power of many mini­
computers often exceeds the capabilities of 
some current large-scale computer systems. 
Preprogrammed applications, such as 
accounts receivable, accounts payable, pay­
roll, and general ledger, are widely available 
for minicomputers as well as for other com­
puters. Utility software programs, such as pro­
gram library maintenance and control pro­
grams, generalized report writers, and data
base management systems commonly used in 
large-scale computer environments are avail­
able for some minicomputers.
There are, however, significant differences 
between minicomputers and larger computers. 
A minicomputer costs less than a larger sys­
tem; in fact, some minicomputers can be pur­
chased for less than the cost of one month’s 
rental of a large-scale computer. Special air 
conditioning, humidity controls, and electrical 
power circuits may not be necessary for the 
operation of minicomputers. Relatively little 
space is necessary for a minicomputer, and its 
small size makes it easy to move.
However, minicomputers do have certain 
limitations. Large-scale computers can perform 
a greater variety of technical and application- 
related functions, and large-scale computers 
provide greater storage capacity than even the 
largest minicomputers.
Relevance to the Auditor
Auditors are encountering an increasing num­
ber of organizations that use minicomputers to 
process accounting information. Many small or­
ganizations now use minicomputers because of 
their comparatively low cost, and minicompu­
ters have proliferated throughout different divi­
sions of large organizations.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
no. 1 states:
Since the definition and related basic concepts 
of accounting control are expressed in terms of 
objectives, they are independent of the method 
of data processing used; consequently, they 
apply equally to manual, mechanical, and elec­
tronic data processing systems. However, the 
organization and procedures required to ac­
complish these objectives may be influenced 
by the method of data processing used.1
SAS no. 3, The E ffe c ts  o f  E D P  on  the  A u d i­
to r ’s S tu d y  a n d  E v a lu a tio n  o f  In te rn a l C on tro l, 
adds:
When EDP is used in significant accounting 
applications, the auditor should consider the 
EDP activity in his study and evaluation of ac­
counting control. This is true whether the use of 
EDP in accounting applications is limited or ex­
tensive. . . .2
This caveat is valid regardless of the type 
or size of the computer used to process signifi­
cant accounting applications.
1AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (New York: 1973), section 
320, paragraph 33.
2 AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards 3, The Effects of EDP on the Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control 
(New York: 1974), paragraph 3.
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Control Considerations in a
Minicomputer
The characteristics of the minicomputer envi­
ronment described in the preceding section 
may result in a weak overall control of that 
environment. This section identifies and de­
scribes several of the control characteristics 
that may exist in the minicomputer environ­
ment, the risks associated with these charac­
teristics, and the controls required to reduce 
these risks.3
The impact of these characteristics and 
the associated risks will vary according to the
Environment
extent to which the application is automated, 
according to the type and significance of finan­
cial transactions being processed, and accord­
ing to the application controls established 
within the system.
Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of 
the minicomputer environment, lists the risks 
associated with each characteristic, and identi­
fies some controls (see figure 1 at the end of 
this section).
Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the 
EDP Department and Users
In a minicomputer environment, the auditor 
may find that personnel in the user department 
initiate and authorize source documents, enter 
data into the system, operate the computer, 
and use the output reports. In such an environ­
ment, the EDP function generally is not segre­
gated from the user’s activities, and the per­
sonnel initiating and authorizing transactions 
may control the entire processing of those 
transactions.
Risks. Lack of segregation of functions be­
tween the EDP department and users may per­
mit the perpetration and concealment of errors 
and irregularities—a situation analogous to a 
manual system in which the accounting depart­
ment consists of only one or two people.
Lack of segregation of functions also may 
result in unauthorized changes to master files, 
which in turn can result in inaccurate and in­
complete processing. If users also have ac­
cess to company assets, there is an additional 
risk of diversion of such assets.
Without a control function, independent of 
the user’s operation department, to receive all 
data for processing, ensure all data are author­
ized and recorded, follow up all errors de­
tected during processing, and verify the proper
distribution of output, processing errors may 
result. Inadequate control over data movement 
may result in lost, added, or altered data. Un­
less the system can reduce these risks, the 
auditor may be faced with a poorly controlled 
accounting system.
Controls. Controls may reduce the risks asso­
ciated with the lack of segregation of user and 
EDP functions. The company may use an ef­
fective system of transaction logs and batch 
controls. Personnel independent of transaction 
authorization and processing may maintain or 
review processing logs, transaction logs, and 
reports of batch control information. Effective 
supervision may be a control in some minicom­
puter environments, and passwords could be 
introduced to control access to files and librar­
ies. In addition, the company may require per­
sonnel periodically to take vacations and rotate 
duties. This latter requirement provides not only 
some control but also cross-training.
An organization may achieve some control 
by reconciling record counts or hash totals. 
Additional control may be obtained by requir­
ing that all master file changes be made by 
application programs, not by utility programs 
provided by the manufacturer. For example, all
3 For a more complete discussion of controls see The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control in EDP Systems (New 
York: AICPA, 1977).
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changes, additions, and deletions to the em­
ployee payroll master file could be authorized 
in writing on prenumbered forms and posted to 
the master file by an application program. A 
control over the posting might be to compare 
the record count and totals on the file mainte­
nance listing with predetermined totals made 
from the source documents to ensure that only 
authorized changes have been made and that 
all source documents have been accounted 
for.
Transaction counts and other batch-type 
controls may be employed in minicomputer 
systems. Control totals may be established 
over the number of transactions and other sig­
nificant numeric information to be entered for
processing. For example, these control totals 
could be recorded manually in batch control 
logs. The control log totals could then be rec­
onciled with input and output totals by the 
same individual who enters and processes the 
transactions, but it might be more effective if 
the logs were maintained by another individual 
who is independent of the data entry and proc­
essing functions.
The lack of segregation of functions be­
tween EDP and users has a pervasive effect on 
the structure of internal accounting controls in 
an organization. Many of the potential risks as­
sociated with the other characteristics of the 
minicomputer environment are related to the 
lack of segregation of functions.
Location of the Computer
In a minicomputer environment, the computer 
is often located in the same area as the user 
department rather than in a separate data 
processing department. Because minicompu­
ters are not very sensitive to temperature, hu­
midity, and other environmental factors, man­
agement is not inclined to locate the 
minicomputer in a physically secure area. Also, 
in many installations the computer can be ac­
cessed through terminals located throughout 
the organization.
Risks. The location of the minicomputer may 
result in weaknesses in access controls, which 
may result in improper use or manipulation of 
data files, unauthorized use or modification of 
computer programs, or improper use of com­
puter resources.
Controls. System software in some minicom­
puters may enable management to control ac­
cess to programs and data files by restricting 
access to specific menus and procedures. A
m e n u  is a list of items or jobs from which a 
terminal operator may make a selection. A p r o ­
c e d u re  is a set of control statements that 
causes a series of programs or jobs to be 
processed. By restricting access to specific 
menus and procedures, management may 
control unauthorized computer processing. For 
example, this technique allows management to 
prevent unauthorized personnel from executing 
specific applications, such as payroll and dis­
bursements.
Some minicomputer systems may generate 
reports that identify individuals using the sys­
tem, record the programs executed, and spec­
ify other relevant information. Management re­
view of these reports may be an effective 
access control. Also, management may period­
ically compare these reports with a predeter­
mined processing schedule to verify that only 
authorized processing has been performed. In 
addition, some systems provide the option to 
replace a minicomputer on/off switch with a 
key lock to control use of the system.
Lack of Segregation of Functions Within the 
EDP Department
The functions of programming and operating 
the computer are normally not separated be­
cause of the limited number of personnel in the 
minicomputer environment. Programs and data
files are frequently resident on the system at all 
times and are accessible to any individual who 
operates the minicomputer. Frequently, in a 
minicomputer environment, one nonmanage­
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ment individual is assigned primary responsi­
bility for the system, including dealing with the 
hardware and software vendor, maintaining the 
system, and training the operators.
Risks. Unrestricted access to program or data 
files may result in unauthorized access to infor­
mation and in the perpetration and conceal­
ment of errors or irregularities.
Controls. Controls over access to programs 
can vary considerably in a minicomputer envi­
ronment. The form in which programs are 
maintained (object code or source code) can 
limit their exposure to unauthorized changes. 
Some programming languages (for example, 
COBOL and RPG) require the use of a com­
piler to convert the source code (programming 
language) into object code (machine-executa­
ble statements). When application programs 
are not available to the user in source code 
form, unauthorized changes are difficult to 
make, and this control may make certain 
changes virtually impossible. Programs can be 
modified more easily if source code is avail­
able; in such cases, the compiler could be 
maintained off-line in a secured area. The audi­
tor should be aware, however, that copies of 
compilers can be obtained from outside 
sources and copied onto the system to perform 
unauthorized programming activity.
Some minicomputers provide system- 
generated library directories containing the 
date on which the object programs were cata­
logued to the system. Management may com­
pare these directories with manually main­
tained records to determine that only 
authorized program changes have been made.
The availability of these library directories de­
pends on the particular computer system and 
its systems software. If library directories are 
not available, management may periodically 
compare the program in use with an authorized 
version to verify that the correct program is 
being used.
Some minicomputers use interpretive lan­
guage programs that are stored in source 
code and converted to machine-executable in­
structions each time the instruction is exe­
cuted. Control over program changes may be 
a problem in such installations because 
changes can be made without leaving any evi­
dence of the change. Some manufacturers pro­
vide the user with ability to lock the program 
files, making them inaccessible for unauthor­
ized modification.
System software may provide an access 
control to program and data files similar to that 
of a librarian function by requiring the insertion 
of a code or password into the system before 
an individual can gain access to files and data. 
However, this control will be effective only if the 
code is restricted to individuals whose duties 
require access to program files and data.
Systems software controls may permit em­
ployees with different levels of responsibility to 
have different access and inquiry capabilities. 
For example, a “ read only” facility permits in­
quiry of the master files and the execution of 
programs but prohibits modification. Through 
this control, management could limit the payroll 
clerk to processing only payroll functions and 
could assign another individual, such as the 
personnel manager, to updating the employee 
master files for processing other payroll 
changes.
Limited Knowledge of EDP
In many minicomputer installations, the individ­
ual responsible for data processing has a lim­
ited knowledge of EDP. Supervisors may have 
a thorough knowledge of the operations of their 
department, but they may not have the training 
necessary to understand and to supervise 
computer operations effectively. In practice, 
the minicomputer location, not personnel quali­
fications, often determines the assignment of 
supervisory responsibility.
Risks. Because the experience and level of 
knowledge of the person assigned primary 
EDP responsibility may be limited, programs 
and procedures developed by individuals with
limited knowledge and experience in EDP may 
not conform to management requirements, and 
the review and approval of test results by these 
individuals after program modification may be 
an ineffective control. As a result, the systems 
implemented may not meet management ob­
jectives or operate according to management 
specifications.
Controls. Operations, programs, and systems 
documentation may be required and main­
tained. In addition, management may engage a 
third party to review new or modified programs 
and systems before they are implemented.
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Utility Programs
Many minicomputer systems have utility pro­
grams that allow nontechnical personnel to 
build, change, and access data files. These 
utility programs are frequently used for routine 
functions, such as data capture and file main­
tenance.
Risks. Utility programs provide opportunities 
for unauthorized access and changes to data 
files. For example, they can be used to add 
unauthorized employees to a payroll master file 
without leaving an audit trail, or they can be
used to fraudulently modify significant financial 
data. Since they are designed for general use, 
utility programs may not contain all the controls 
that are desirable for a particular function.
Controls. Using passwords to limit access to 
data files may prevent an unauthorized individ­
ual from updating or changing the contents of 
a file. Also, the company may use application 
programs rather than utility programs to update 
transaction or master files.
Diskettes
Diskettes—also known as floppy disks—are a 
direct access magnetic storage medium with 
limited storage capacity used in some mini­
computers to maintain both master files and 
transaction files. They are not normally used on 
large-scale computers for this purpose.
Risks. If the system software does not include 
the capability to perform effective internal label 
checking on diskettes, the identification of the 
correct version of the file is largely the respon­
sibility of the operator who, in some cases, 
may also be the user. As a result, there are no 
controls to prevent the processing of wrong 
files, to detect errors in file changes, or to 
highlight operator errors.
The use of diskettes as the storage me­
dium for master files creates the risk of data 
manipulation through data entry devices as 
well as through computer programs. Informa­
tion on diskettes may be modified by data en­
try devices without producing a record of the 
change.
Controls. These risks may be decreased by 
restricting access to diskettes to authorized in­
dividuals only. A control feature on some mini­
computers allows the user to store data on 
diskettes in a format that is not readable by 
data entry devices. Manual logs may also be 
maintained to control the library of diskette 
files.
Terminals
In a minicomputer environment, terminals are 
generally used for transaction data entry, in­
quiry, and other interactive functions. Because 
transaction entry usually accounts for the larg­
est volume of activity, it usually accounts for 
the greatest number of potential errors. In a 
minicomputer environment, transactions are 
frequently entered through on-line terminals 
and edited as part of the entry process.
Risks. Some minicomputer environments may 
lack adequate provisions for ensuring that 
transactions are properly authorized. This may 
result in erroneous or fraudulent data. The un­
restricted use of terminals can result in weak 
access controls over programs and data files, 
and unauthorized access to data files and pro­
grams creates the risk of improper use or ma­
nipulation of those files or programs. Also, the 
individual who is responsible for entering trans­
actions into the system may also be the indi­
vidual who is authorized to approve them.
Controls. The control of data entered through 
a terminal may be established by using soft­
ware that will allow only certain terminals to be 
used for specific transactions and by using a 
combination of physical access controls, such 
as key locks and locked rooms. In addition, the 
entry of identification or passwords may be re­
quired for an operator to execute specific func­
tions. For example, the terminal located in the 
payroll department could be restricted to pay­
roll transactions only.
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Controls over on-line entry procedures 
may be designed into the system to provide a 
means to reduce data entry errors. For exam­
ple, in an inventory application, the system 
could check to determine that a sales transac­
tion contains a valid part number, that the 
sales quantity does not exceed the quantity on 
hand, and that the unit of measure is appropri­
ate.
Another control technique involves encryp­
tion of program and data files. E n c ry p tio n  is 
the process of converting data into uninterpret­
able representation that can be read only by 
use of the algorithm. If this technique is used, 
the access to the algorithm should be re­
stricted to authorized personnel only. In many 
systems, passwords are encrypted to prevent 
users from accessing the password file and 
reading the contents.
Software Packages
Companies using minicomputers frequently do 
not develop application software internally but 
acquire the software from outside sources.
Risks. If management lacks EDP knowledge, 
the acquired systems may not be properly re­
viewed and tested to ensure that they meet 
management and user objectives and that they 
have adequate application controls.
Controls. Management may use a third party 
to review and evaluate proposed software 
packages before they are implemented.
On the other hand, there may be control 
advantages in using application software ac­
quired from outside sources. In some cases, 
software vendors do not provide source pro­
gram versions, which makes it difficult to mod­
ify the programs.
Documentation
Available system, program, operation, and user 
documentation may be limited or nonexistent.
Risks. A company that does not have ade­
quate documentation may not have an under­
standing of the flow of transactions through the 
system. This may result in undetected errors
during data entry, processing, and system 
maintenance.
Controls. A company may employ a number of 
application controls over access, data entry, 
transaction balancing, program change, and 
output to reduce the risks associated with lack 
of adequate documentation.
Summary
The characteristics described in this section 
have accompanying risks that the auditor 
should consider in the study and evaluation of 
internal accounting controls in organizations 
using minicomputers. Many of these risks result 
from the lack of segregation of functions and 
the inadequate access controls established 
within the system.
In the minicomputer environment, as else­
where, the auditor reviews the system of inter­
nal accounting controls established by an or­
ganization over the processing of financial
transactions. The combination of manual and 
EDP application controls for specific applica­
tions may be sufficient to achieve control ob­
jectives and to offset risks associated with 
weaknesses in general controls. Effective con­
trols, appropriately tested, may enable the aud­
itor to reduce substantive testing procedures. 
When controls are not in place to reduce the 
risks discussed, the auditor would be limited to 
performing substantive procedures to gain rea­
sonable assurance that material errors and ir­
regularities are not present.
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FIGURE 1
CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS IN A MINICOMPUTER ENVIRONMENT
Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users
(Personnel in the user department initiate and authorize source documents, enter data into the system, operate 
the computer, and use the output reports.)
Risks
Perpetration and concealment of errors or irregularities.
Unauthorized changes to master files.
Inaccurate and incomplete processing of data.
Processing errors.
Incomplete or erroneous data.
Uncorrected errors.
Lost, added, or altered data.
Controls
Maintenance of transaction logs and batch controls by user department.
Independent review of processing logs, transaction logs, and batch control information.
Management supervision.
Passwords to control access to files and libraries.
Required vacations and rotation of duties.
Reconciliation of record counts or hash totals.
Use of application programs to make changes in master files.
Independent reconciliation of transaction totals recorded in batch control logs with input and output totals. 
Comparison of system manufacturer’s utility program with authorized application version.
Location of the Computer
(The computer is located in the same area as the user department.)
Risks
Improper use or manipulation of data files.
Unauthorized use or modification of computer programs.
Improper use of computer resources.
Controls
Menus and procedures to control processing access.
Management review of usage reports (history logs).
Periodic comparison of usage reports with processing schedule.
Physical control over data entry devices.
Lack of Segregation of Functions Within the EDP Department
(There is no segregation between programmers and operators.)
Risks
Unauthorized access to information and programs.
Perpetration and concealment of errors or irregularities.
Errors caused by improper use or manipulation of data files or unauthorized or incorrect use of computer 
program.
Application programs that do not meet management's objectives.
Controls
Use of a compiler to convert the source code into object code.
Comparison of library directories with manual records.
Comparison of program in use with an authorized version.
Use of interpretive language programs.
Passwords to control access to libraries and files.
Software controls to limit system access capabilities according to employee function.
Test libraries.
Management review of usage reports (history logs).
Systems of transaction logs, batch controls, processing logs, and run-to-run controls.
Limited Knowledge of EDP
(Supervisor responsible for data processing has limited knowledge of EDP.)
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Failure of systems to meet management objectives or operate according to management specifications.
Lack of adequate application controls.
Inadequate testing and review of systems.
Controls
Operations documentation.
Program documentation.
Systems documentation.
Use of third party to review new and modified programs and systems.
Utility Programs
(Utility programs are used extensively to enter and to change data.)
Risks
Unauthorized access and changes to data.
Undetected errors in file manipulation.
Lack of adequate application controls.
Processing of unauthorized transactions and omitting of authorized transactions.
Perpetration and concealment of errors or irregularities.
Controls
Use of passwords to control access to data files.
Use of application programs to update files.
Independent control over transaction and master file changes, such as item count, control total, and hash totals. 
Limited access to utilities.
Removal of utilities from system when practical to do so.
Diskettes
(Diskettes are used extensively for file storage.)
Risks
Processing of the wrong file.
Inability to detect errors in file changes.
Inability to highlight operator errors.
Controls
Control over access to diskettes.
Storage of data in format not readable by key entry devices.
Use of manual logs to control diskette library.
Terminals
(Terminals are used for transaction data entry, inquiry, and other interactive functions.)
Risks
Unauthorized input.
Erroneous or fraudulent data.
Errors caused by improper use or manipulation of data files or computer programs.
Erroneous or incomplete data.
Controls
Use of software that will allow only certain terminals to be used for specific functions.
Use of physical controls to limit access to data files.
Use of passwords to control access to data files.
Encryption of data and programs.
On-line computer edit procedures.
Record counts, batch controls, run-to-run controls, verification.
Error handling control procedure and error logs.
Use of menus and procedures.
Software Packages
(Purchased software packages are used extensively rather than internally developed application software.)
R isks
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Failure of systems to meet management and user objectives.
Lack of adequate application controls.
Inadequate testing of systems.
Controls
Use of third party to review and evaluate proposed software packages.
Documentation
(Available system program, operation, and user documentation may be limited or nonexistent.) 
Risks
Undetected errors during processing and system maintenance.
Controls
User-based controls.
R isks
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Audit Considerations
The preceding section described the internal 
accounting controls in a minicomputer environ­
ment. This section describes audit and plan­
ning considerations contained in SAS 1, C o d if i­
c a tio n  o f  A u d it in g  S ta n d a rd s  a n d  P ro c e d u re s , 
SAS 3, The E ffe c ts  o f  E D P  on  the  A u d ito r ’s 
S tu d y  a n d  E v a lu a tio n  o f  In te rn a l C o n tro l, and 
SAS 22, P la n n in g  a n d  S u p e rv is io n . It also de­
scribes substantive audit techniques and pro­
vides guidance in selecting computer-assisted 
audit techniques appropriate to particular cir­
cumstances.
The use of a minicomputer to process ac­
counting applications generally affects the 
planning of an audit. SAS 3 states, “When EDP 
is used in significant accounting applications, 
the auditor should consider the EDP activity in 
his study and evaluation of accounting control. 
This is true whether the use of EDP in account­
ing applications is limited or extensive. . . .”
The auditor’s considerations of internal ac­
counting controls may be an important part of 
the examination. The existence of a minicom­
puter also may have an impact upon the plan­
ning of the nature, timing, and extent of audit
procedures to be applied in an examination of 
the financial statements. Planning and conduct­
ing the audit in this environment may require 
special skills, and the auditor may find the fol­
lowing knowledge helpful:
•  A general understanding of computer sys­
tems including equipment components and 
their capabilities.
•  A general understanding of computer oper­
ating systems and software.
•  Familiarity with file processing techniques 
and data structures.
•  Knowledge of program and systems docu­
mentation.
•  Working knowledge of EDP accounting con­
trols to identify and evaluate the controls in 
the organization’s installation.
•  Familiarity with the process of developing 
and modifying programs.
•  A general understanding of the risks inherent 
in using computers to process significant 
financial information.
Planning the Audit
The use of a minicomputer may affect the na­
ture, timing, and extent of audit procedures. 
The conditions that distinguish a computer sys­
tem from a manual system and that, in turn, 
affect the planning of an audit are described 
briefly below.
•  Many control procedures in manual systems 
leave documentary evidence of perform­
ance. Since comparable control procedures 
in computer systems often leave no docu­
mentary evidence of performance, special­
ized compliance tests may be required.
•  Information in manual systems is visible, 
whereas files and records in EDP systems 
are usually recorded in machine-sensible 
form that cannot be read without the use of 
the computer.
•  The decrease of human involvement in the 
handling of transactions in EDP systems can 
obscure errors that might have been caught 
in a manual system.
•  With proper controls in place, EDP systems 
can provide a greater degree of reliability 
than manual systems because they uniformly 
subject all data to the same controls.
•  An auditor ordinarily must obtain special 
knowledge of EDP (SAS 3, paragraph 4) to 
develop an understanding of complex EDP 
systems (used in some minicomputer instal­
lations) and to perform tests of compliance 
and other necessary audit procedures, 
which requires a significant amount of train­
ing beyond that needed for working with 
manual systems.
•  An auditor may want to become familiar with 
the design and testing of new EDP systems 
at an early stage in the development proc­
ess in order to anticipate possible problems 
in future audits of those systems because of 
the difficulty in making changes after an EDP 
system has been implemented.
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Obtaining Knowledge of the Entity
Study and Evaluation of Internal 
Accounting Controls
The study of internal accounting controls in­
cludes both the EDP and non-EDP features of 
the minicomputer system and should provide 
the auditor with an understanding of the flow of 
transactions through the accounting system, a 
grasp of the extent to which EDP is used in 
each significant accounting application, and 
the knowledge of the procedures designed to 
achieve the objectives of internal accounting 
controls. An auditor’s study and evaluation of a 
company's system of internal accounting con­
trols should encompass all significant manual, 
mechanical, and EDP activities, as well as the 
relation between EDP and the departments us­
ing the information.
In a minicomputer environment, as else­
where, the auditor should consider the system 
of internal accounting controls, reliance on 
which may allow restriction of substantive pro­
cedures. In this environment, the system in­
cludes both the general EDP controls and the 
manual and EDP application controls.
Because general EDP controls are fre­
quently weak in a minicomputer environment, 
the auditor may find it more effective to con­
centrate on application controls in the study of 
internal accounting controls. The auditor, how­
ever, should consider the effect of weaknesses 
in general EDP controls and should be aware 
of the potential impact of specific weaknesses 
in these controls upon application controls.
With an understanding of these weaknesses, 
the auditor should be able to anticipate the 
errors and irregularities that could occur in the 
individual applications and be alert to potential 
application controls to reduce the risks inherent 
in the minicomputer environment. In some 
cases, weaknesses in general EDP controls 
may reduce the reliability of application con­
trols. In other cases, application controls and 
controls independent of the EDP function may
be adequate to allow the auditor to rely on 
them to determine the nature, timing, and ex­
tent of audit procedures. A combination of 
manual and EDP internal accounting controls 
for specific applications may be adequate to 
achieve internal accounting control objectives. 
When internal accounting controls are not ade­
quate to reduce the risks inherent in the envi­
ronment, the auditor would not rely on those 
controls in planning the nature, timing, and ex­
tent of substantive procedures.
The techniques which are appropriate for 
testing internal accounting controls in a mini­
computer environment are essentially the same 
as in other computer environments. However, 
the design of many minicomputer applications 
can have an impact upon the auditor’s ap­
proach to the review of application controls. 
Some of the elements of an accounting appli­
cation that would be of interest to the auditor 
during the review of application controls are
•  Identification of transactions
•  Flow of transactions
•  Computer processing steps
•  Output reports
Minicomputer systems are frequently de­
signed for on-line transaction entry. Since writ­
ten documentation of minicomputer systems 
may be poor, the auditor’s approach to identi­
fying significant transactions may vary. The dis­
play of transaction categories and types on the 
terminal screen may be the only source of 
transaction identity available to the auditor. In 
minicomputer systems that perform on-line in­
teractive editing of transactions, the only evi­
dence of these edits might be error messages 
displayed on the terminal. Consequently, the 
auditor might observe the entry of valid and
4 AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards 22, Planning and Supervision (New York: 1978).
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The auditor should understand the nature of 
the business and the accounting system being 
audited, as well as the features of the minicom­
puter environment.4 The auditor should under­
stand the use of the minicomputer in significant
financial applications, including the organiza­
tion of the EDP function within the entity and 
the nature of the accounting applications being 
processed.
invalid transactions to determine the existence 
of edit controls. The auditor should then con­
sider the need to determine if these edit con­
trols were functioning throughout the period un­
der examination.
The flow of transactions through the ac­
counting system includes the procedures for 
authorizing and originating data, controlling in­
put to the system, editing and capturing data 
within the system, and assuring that rejected 
transactions are corrected and re-entered 
promptly. When the auditor finds that a single 
individual has responsibility for all these func­
tions, it may be necessary to determine what
independent activities exist to control these 
processes.
In many minicomputer environments, the 
specific processing steps performed by the 
system may be transparent to the user-opera­
tor. When application software has been ac­
quired from outside sources, it may be neces­
sary for the auditor to obtain additional 
information from the supplier to obtain an ade­
quate understanding of computer processing 
steps. An understanding of the computer proc­
essing steps and the information retained by 
the system helps the auditor to design appro­
priate audit procedures.
Substantive Audit Techniques
In a minicomputer environment, the techniques 
used to accomplish substantive procedures 
may differ from those used in a large-scale 
computer environment. Some of the conditions 
in the minicomputer environment contributing 
to the differences are the following:
•  Manual procedures may be cost-justified by 
lower data volumes.
•  Generalized audit software may not be avail­
able for some minicomputers.
•  Minicomputers frequently have utility pro­
grams that can be used by the auditor.
In determining the appropriateness of 
manual substantive procedures in a minicom­
puter environment, the auditor considers the
results of the evaluation of internal accounting 
controls, the information that is needed to ac­
complish substantive auditing objectives, and 
the source of this information. The auditor may 
also consider the cost-effectiveness of manual 
as opposed to computer-assisted audit tech­
niques. If a complete and documented audit 
trail is available or if the volume of data subject 
to review and testing is relatively small, it may 
be more cost-effective to use manual tech­
niques. On the other hand, if the audit trail is 
obscured or if data volumes are very large, the 
use of computer-assisted audit techniques may 
be more effective and efficient.
If the auditor determines that manual audit­
ing procedures are appropriate, the same 
types of procedures used in a manual system 
generally apply to a minicomputer environment.
Computer-Assisted Audit Techniques
The use of a minicomputer to perform audit 
tests is another important consideration. Some 
computer-assisted audit techniques are avail­
able for use on minicomputer systems, and the 
AICPA audit and accounting guide, C o m p u te r-  
A s s is te d  A u d it  T e c h n iq u e s , describes com­
monly used techniques and their applicability. 
The auditor can determine the feasibility of 
these techniques by reviewing the minicompu­
ter’s software capabilities and data file struc­
tures and contents.
Computer-assisted audit techniques gen­
erally require the use of computer data files. 
Planning for their use includes obtaining de­
tailed information about the required files.
Since data in machine-sensible files are con­
stantly changing, the auditor should make prior 
arrangements with the company to obtain a 
copy of the appropriate data files as of a spec­
ified date.
Generalized Audit Software. Generalized au­
dit software is a computer program or a series 
of programs designed to perform certain data 
processing functions. The software can read 
computer files, select desired information, per­
form calculations, and print reports in a format 
specified by the auditor. The use of software 
does not normally require knowledge of a pro­
gramming language, and it facilitates audit 
documentation.
If generalized audit software is available
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for a minicomputer system, the auditor should 
consider using it. If it is not available, the audi­
tor may be able to process minicomputer-gen­
erated files on large-scale computers for which 
generalized audit software is available. In eval­
uating such an approach, the auditor should 
consider the following conditions:
•  Compatibility of the minicomputer's data file 
media with those of the large-scale com­
puter.
•  Compatibility of the minicomputer’s data rep­
resentation with that of the large-scale com­
puter.
•  Confidentiality of client data.
•  Cost of using a large-scale computer.
Most minicomputer systems use disks and 
diskettes for storing data. Disk files used by 
minicomputers are generally not compatible 
with the disk units installed on large-scale com­
puters. Minicomputers may also use fixed 
disks, which cannot be removed from the sys­
tem and taken elsewhere for processing. The 
most compatible media between minicompu­
ters and large-scale computers are diskettes 
and magnetic tape. Facilities may be available 
to convert minicomputer files into media that 
are compatible with large-scale computers.
Data representation compatibility is an­
other consideration associated with processing 
minicomputer data on a large-scale computer. 
D a ta  re p re s e n ta tio n  is the data code used to 
represent information on computer-sensible 
media. The two most frequently used data rep­
resentation conventions available on minicom­
puters, ASCII and EBCDIC, can be read by 
most large-scale computers. The tasks for the 
auditor are to identify the minicomputer data 
representation convention and to determine its 
compatibility with the computer on which the 
data are to be processed.
If it is necessary to remove the organiza­
tion’s information for processing at an outside 
installation, the confidentiality of the organiza­
tion’s information becomes a consideration in 
deciding whether to use generalized audit soft­
ware. To ensure the confidentiality of the infor­
mation, the auditor might obtain a confidential­
ity agreement with the outside organization, be 
present to control the processing, and ensure 
that data generated during processing are de­
leted upon completion.
The auditor may use certain types of gen­
eralized audit software packages known as 
source program generator packages that are 
compatible only with large-scale computers to 
generate programs that can be processed on 
a minicomputer. Such packages generate cus­
tomized source programs based on user-spec­
ified parameters. Using this type of software, it 
may be possible to develop the source pro­
gram for the minicomputer application at an­
other computer installation and then, with some 
further changes, to compile and execute the 
generated program on the minicomputer. This 
approach requires more EDP expertise than is 
typically needed to use a generalized audit 
software package in its native environment.
The use of generalized audit software to 
process minicomputer data files may be cost- 
justified in certain circumstances. If general­
ized audit software contains needed special 
audit routines not available from other sources, 
it may be more cost-effective to use the gener­
alized audit software on another computer than 
to perform the task manually or through other 
computer-assisted audit techniques.
Utility Programs. Utility programs are usually 
available on minicomputers and can be used 
for certain audit tasks. The more widely used 
minicomputers may provide utility programs 
with extended capabilities to access data files, 
to perform mathematical and logical opera­
tions, and to generate output files. While these 
utilities do not provide all of the functions that 
can be performed by a programming lan­
guage, they are less complex and easier to 
use.
The inquiry-language utility programs avail­
able on some minicomputers may be used to 
perform audit procedures. Applications include 
accessing a client data file, printing a sample 
of records for review and testing, and develop­
ing control totals. For example, the auditor may 
use a utility program to accumulate totals from 
an accounts payable file and to print details for 
audit testing. The auditor may also use a utility 
program to print the details of invoices that 
contain the date of goods received on or near 
the end of the year to assist in reviewing inven­
tory and payable cut-offs.
The use of utility programs in the audit 
should be carefully coordinated with the client 
to minimize the risk that the auditor might intro­
duce errors into the data file under review. The 
control concerns regarding utilities described 
in the preceding section also apply to the audi­
tor’s use of them. In this regard, the auditor 
should consider the application of typical audit 
control considerations as described in the 
AICPA audit and accounting guide, C o m p u te r-  
A s s is te d  A u d it  T e c h n iq u e s .
Specialized Audit Programs. Specialized au­
dit programs are written to perform specific 
audit tasks, and they may provide a cost-effec­
tive approach for applying certain audit proce­
dures in a minicomputer environment. Special­
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ized audit programs require more technical 
knowledge and documentation effort than gen­
eralized audit software packages. The consid­
erations for using specialized audit software in 
a minicomputer environment are the same as 
in any computer environment.
A potentially cost-effective method of ob­
taining specialized audit software is the use of 
existing client programs. Modifying existing 
programs can be more cost-effective than in­
dependently developing special audit pro­
grams. This approach requires the auditor to 
verify that the modified program functions as 
intended and to exercise control over process­
ing before the auditor can rely on the output.
This approach can be particularly appro­
priate for accounts receivable. An accounts re­
ceivable system installed on a minicomputer 
may include the capability of selecting and 
generating accounts receivable confirmation 
requests. The system may have the capability 
of selecting accounts according to various cri­
teria, such as by every nth item, by specified 
account numbers, or by correspondence of a 
specified number to one digit of the account 
number. To determine that the confirmation re­
quests correspond to the specified selection
criteria, the auditor can review and verify the 
selection program logic, observe the process­
ing of the program, and determine that the 
master file corresponds to the population being 
tested. Another approach would be to deter­
mine the validity of the selection criteria ap­
plied by comparing the confirmation requests 
with a listing of the total population that had 
been footed and agreed with an account bal­
ance.
Other Computer-Assisted Audit Techniques.
The AICPA audit and accounting guide, C o m ­
p u te r -A s s is te d  A u d it  T e c h n iq u e s , describes 
other techniques, such as test data, program 
logic review, and timesharing, that can be ap­
plicable in a minicomputer environment. The 
primary factors in evaluating the desirability of 
such techniques are their cost-effectiveness, 
the auditor’s proficiency in EDP, and the ef­
fects of weaknesses in internal accounting con­
trols. If there are weaknesses in general con­
trols, such as controls over changes to 
production programs, then certain techniques, 
such as using test data, reviewing program 
logic, and employing audit modules, may not 
yield reliable audit information.
Summary
The use of a minicomputer may affect the na­
ture and timing of the audit and may require 
skills in addition to those necessary in auditing 
financial statements from manual systems. 
Auditors assigned should be knowledgeable 
about the features and capabilities of minicom­
puters. Participation by knowledgeable individ­
uals in audit planning can improve audit pro­
ductivity by using the computer to perform 
audit tests.
The appendix describes a small business 
computer and identifies the features relevant to 
control and audit procedures. Examples of us­
ing such features to accomplish audit proce­
dures are also presented.
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Appendix
There are numerous minicomputers and small 
business computers used to process financial 
applications. Although many minicomputer sys­
tems have similar features and capabilities, the 
IBM System/34 is used to illustrate the con­
cepts presented in this guideline. This appen­
dix describes the System/34 environment, lists 
its hardware and software features exclusive of 
application programs, and provides examples 
of the use of a software utility to perform audit 
tasks. (The aspects of the System/34 relevant 
to internal controls are shaded in gray.) When 
auditing in other minicomputer environments,
the auditor should obtain an understanding of 
the features available on the specific minicom­
puter.
Some of the material presented was com­
piled from information provided by the IBM 
Corporation. Because changes in hardware 
and systems software are continually being 
made, the specifications contained herein 
might not represent current specifications, and 
no effort has been made to verify the accuracy 
or completeness of the information provided by 
IBM.
A Minicomputer System
The System/34 is a general purpose, small 
business system with the capability of using 
several programming languages. The system is 
used in a variety of industries. For example, in 
a small distributing enterprise, the small busi­
ness system can be used to process applica­
tions that perform order entry, billing, accounts
receivable, inventory control, sales analysis, 
payroll, general ledger, and accounts payable. 
To show the capability of the system, the data 
provided below was selected from the records 
of several "average” System/34 users in hard- 
goods.
Number of accounts receivable 
Inventory item master records 
Inventory item balance records (one record per 
item per warehouse)
Special or contract prices 
Invoices per day
Open orders (including backorders)
Vendors
General ledger accounts 
Employees
There may be two members of the data 
processing staff in the System/34 environment, 
a programmer/operator and a data entry oper­
ator. The major function of the programmer/ 
operator may be to operate the system and to 
perform maintenance on standard application 
packages. The data entry function may also be 
performed by users through work stations lo­
cated in their areas. The individual with primary 
responsibility for the system typically may not 
have had previous EDP experience or training,
Range
Average Low High
3,500 1,000 20,000
15,000 1,000 40,000
18,000 1,000 80,000
3,400 2,000 12,000
200 80 900
800 400 4,000
300 150 500
300 200 400
25 10 60
and management may often rely on this indi­
vidual to make the daily decisions related to 
data processing activities.
Personnel in the user department may not 
understand EDP concepts either. As a result, 
they rely on the vendor or the in-house pro­
grammer/operator for assistance in doing their 
jobs. The programmer/operator may not have 
an understanding of accounting and user 
needs, and this lack of communication may 
result in productivity and control problems.
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Hardware Features of a Minicomputer System
The basic System/34 configuration consists of 
a processing unit (CPU), memory, Work Station 
Controller, disk storage, and printer. The proc­
essing unit, memory, disk storage, and diskette 
drive are contained in a single enclosure 
known as the system unit. Exhibit F (on page 
34) is an illustration of a minicomputer configu­
ration.
Processing Unit. The processing unit provides 
the logic function and control for memory, 
which ranges from 32K to 256K bytes. The 
data is represented internally as extended bi­
nary coded decimal interchange code 
(EBCDIC).
Whenever the system unit is turned on, 
the system performs a test of the hardware 
by a program known as the initial program 
load (IPL), which includes a sequence of 
steps that loads the system programs and 
prepares the system for the execution of 
jobs. When an application program is exe­
cuted, the system continually verifies that the 
hardware and systems software are function­
ing. If an error is detected, the processing 
unit will alert the user and either issue a 
request for action or terminate processing.
The error is then recorded on the diagnostic 
log (a reserved area on the disk), which 
stores information used for subsequent hard­
ware maintenance. The power supply of the 
system unit can prematurely sense a reduc­
tion of voltage and retract the read/write 
heads automatically to prevent damage to 
data on the disk.
Work Station Controller. The Work Station 
Controller is commonly known as the input/ 
output controller in this system. Up to 16 local 
devices (display stations or printers) are sup­
ported by the Work Station Controller in the 
system unit, and these devices may be located 
up to 1500 meters (5000 cable feet) from the 
system unit. Up to 64 additional devices can 
communicate with the system by means of 
telecommunications. The polling (interrogation) 
of local devices is performed by the Work Sta­
tion Controller without CPU interference. Polling 
of remotely attached devices is accomplished 
through the binary synchronous communica­
tions adaptor and systems support programs.
The Work Station Controller contains 
logic that can be used to detect certain in­
put errors based upon criteria established in 
the application programs. Editing that can 
be performed by the Work Station Controller 
includes tests for completeness of data, self- 
checking digit calculation, and alpha­
numeric validation. Other program editing 
may be performed by the CPU based upon 
the design of the application program. When 
an error is detected, further input through 
the CRT terminal may be inhibited until the 
condition is corrected.1
CRT terminals, called display or work sta­
tions, are the primary means through which 
users enter data, make inquiries, and issue 
system and control commands.
Display stations may be equipped with 
a keylock or a magnetic stripe badge reader 
to control access to the system. Because 
these are optional control features, the audi­
tor should not assume they are installed.2
Three levels of capabilities may be as­
signed to a display station during system 
configuration:
•  System console
•  Command
•  Transaction entry
Only one system console display station 
is active at any given time. Other local dis­
play stations can be identified as alternates, 
but only one becomes active if the system 
console malfunctions or is turned off. The 
system console can perform any function (if 
the appropriate ID and password are in­
serted), and its uses should be restricted.
A command display station can access 
menus (the list of functions available to the 
operator) and initiate programs and proce­
dures based on the user ID and password. 
However, a command display station cannot 
perform system functions, such as library 
manipulations or system configuration 
changes.
A transaction entry display station can 
be used only to enter transaction data. It has 
no command capability or program and pro­
cedure initiation capability. At sign-on time,
1 See “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users” and “Terminals" in this guideline.
2See “Location of the Computer” in this guideline.
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a transaction entry display station is not 
available for transaction entry until another 
display station with command capability or 
instructions in an application program au­
thorizes the transaction entry station to enter 
data.3
Designation of a work station as a trans­
action entry display station, along with other 
security features, can limit entry of specific 
transactions to designated terminals. For ex­
ample, a transaction entry display station in 
an isolated location, such as a warehouse, 
could be restricted to the entry of only ware­
house-related transactions.
Disk Storage. The system unit contains a fixed 
direct access storage device with a capacity 
from 8.6 to 257.4 million bytes. Since the disk 
is not removable, it will be necessary for the
user to implement backup procedures, such as 
copying programs or data files on diskettes 
and storing them in a secure location, in order 
to prevent loss of programs and data.
Diskette Drive. A diskette drive is a standard 
feature of the system unit used both as an 
alternate means of data input and as a means 
for writing information on diskette for off-line 
storage.
Backup of files is performed by diskette 
since the disk is nonremovable. Adequate 
backup procedures should exist to allow re­
covery in the event that the data stored on 
the disk becomes unusable. Recovery nor­
mally becomes necessary as a conse­
quence of errors or loss of data files or pro­
grams.4
Software Features of a Minicomputer System
System software consists of a manufacturer- 
provided group of programs that control all 
processing by the computer. System software 
also includes programs to facilitate functions 
such as sorting data, copying information from 
one media to another, and converting pro­
grams into machine-executable form. Available 
system software for the System/34 includes
•  System support programs
■ Job and main storage management
■ Operation control language
■ System history area
■ Multiple user library support
■ Security
■ Interactive communication feature
■ Backup
•  Utilities
■ Data file utility
■ Sort utility
■ Source entry utility
■ Screen design aid
■ Work station utility
■ Patch procedure
•  Compilers and linkage editor
The system software is provided by the 
vendor on diskettes which normally are re­
tained by the user. Because these diskettes 
can be used to circumvent essentially all 
controls provided by system software, ac­
cess to them should be controlled. The audi­
tor should be aware that diskettes containing 
system software are readily available.
System Support Programs. There are a num­
ber of system support programs available for 
use with the System/34. Several of these sup­
port programs are described below.
J o b  a n d  M a in  S to ra g e  M a n a g e m e n t. The 
System/34 can operate in a single or multi-pro­
gramming mode. In the multi-programming 
mode, multiple programs are executed concur­
rently under the control of the system support 
program task dispatcher. If a program is re­
quested for execution but sufficient storage is 
not available, the system support program will 
swap one or more programs out of memory 
and insert the requested program into memory 
for execution.
3See “Terminals” in this guideline.
4See “ Diskettes” in this guideline.
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Print spooling is supported by the system 
support program in either single or multiple 
mode. Spooling is the process of recording 
output on disk that is, in turn, printed inde­
pendently of application program processing. 
The system operator can start, stop, restart, 
cancel, hold, release, display, and change the 
priority of jobs in the print spool.
Resource security to control access to 
spool files is not available. An operator can­
not directly change the contents of a spool 
file. For the jobs they control, operators can 
only copy the spool file onto a data file. 
However, any changes made to this data file 
cannot be transferred back onto the spool 
file; therefore, compensating controls should 
be developed to prevent unauthorized ac­
cess to information on spool files.
O p e ra tio n  C o n tro l L a n g u a g e . The opera­
tion control language (OCL) provides the major 
communication between the user and the sys­
tem. The OCL statements provide the system 
support programs with all the information re­
quired to execute jobs, such as the names and 
locations of files to be processed and the pro­
grams to be executed.
OCL procedures, which are stored in li­
braries on disk, are groups of OCL statements 
defined by the user and executed by com­
mands entered through the keyboard. The sys­
tem support program provides the user with a 
set of pre-existing procedures that allows the 
operator to allocate files, rename files, copy 
files, build display formats, build job menus, 
condense a program library, and perform li­
brary maintenance. Certain commands can be 
entered from the system console, some can be 
entered only from display stations (including 
the system console when it is being used as a 
display station), and others can be entered 
from either the system console or a display 
station.
OCL commands permit users to request 
a broad range of functions from the system. 
Controls should exist to prevent unauthorized 
changes in system programs and data, and 
access controls should be maintained at the 
library and file level. OCL procedures can pro­
vide a control over the sequence and nature 
of application program processing.5
S ys te m  H is to ry  A re a . A history area that 
contains all executed OCL statements and 
messages is available on disk. This information 
may be retrieved, displayed, printed, or copied 
onto diskette for later access. Individual dis­
play station operators can only display or print 
entries created from their display stations. En­
tries in the history area are stamped to indicate 
the time of the entries and are labeled by the 
job identification generated by the system sup­
port program to assist in determining the se­
quence of activity in the system.
The system history area contains a re­
cord of all attempts to use an invalid pass­
word and of all system halts and the opera­
tor responses to these halts. This information 
can be used by management to monitor and 
control the use of the system.6 History logs 
may be examined to reconstruct the com­
plete sequence of events during a given pe­
riod. This procedure could be useful in de­
termining whether the user is complying with 
prescribed operating procedures.
When the disk file space reserved for 
the history area is full, it will begin to write 
over itself (wraparound), which will result in 
a loss of history information. The user can 
prevent wraparound by specifying a halt at 
system configuration time, which will allow 
the printing of the contents of the history log. 
Through the system console, the user can 
delete the contents in the history area with­
out leaving a record of the deletion. There­
fore, procedures should be developed to 
prevent unauthorized deletion.
M u ltip le  U s e r L ib ra ry  S u p p o rt. Library 
structures within the system provide for mul­
tiple user libraries. This feature can be used 
to establish program test libraries to provide 
control over the integrity of programs in the 
production library.7
S e cu rity . Three types of access controls 
are available:
•  Operator ID and password
•  Menu
•  Resource
These security features are optional and 
are established during system configuration. 
Once the system has been configured to pro­
vide security support, the supports cannot be
5See “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users” and “Terminals” in this guideline.
6See “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users,” “ Location of the Computer,” and “ Lack of
Segregation of Functions Within the EDP Department” in this guideline.
7See “Lack of Segregation of Functions Within the EDP Department" and “Utility Programs” in this guideline.
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changed so long as the password and re­
source files exist. The master security officer is 
the only authorized individual who can execute 
the utility programs that save, restore, or delete 
the security files.
Operator ID and passw ord—Each oper­
ator who signs on to a display station is 
prompted for an identifier (ID), and option­
ally a password, which is verified by the 
system support program before the operator 
is allowed further access to the system.
An operator is allowed to make an un­
limited number of attempts to sign on the 
system. The attempts are recorded on the 
system history area, which can provide man­
agement with the information necessary to 
monitor unauthorized access attempts.
Passwords are stored in the password 
security file that contains a profile for each 
person who is authorized to use the system. 
Each profile contains a user ID and the 4- 
character password assigned to the user.
The password is not displayed on the 
screen when entered but is encrypted in the 
password security disk file. The password 
security file contains codes that identify the 
classifications of users. The list below de­
scribes the classification and function for 
each person authorized to use the system.
•  M aster security o fficer (MSO). Assigned 
during the initial definition of password se­
curity. The MSO can define password and 
magnetic stripe badge security; add, de­
lete, or edit profiles of security officers, 
system operators, and display station op­
erators; change its own password and 
badge ID; and act as a system operator 
or display station operator.
•  Security officer. Assigned by the master 
security officer. A security officer can add, 
delete, or edit profiles of system operators 
and display station operators; change its 
own password and badge ID; and act as 
a system operator or display station oper­
ator,
•  System operator. Assigned by the master 
security officer or by a security officer. A 
system operator can operate any display 
station, including the display station des­
ignated as the system console; however, 
a system operator cannot run the security 
utility programs.
•  Display station operator. Assigned by the 
master security officer or by a security 
officer. A display station operator can op­
erate any display station except the dis­
play station designated as the system
console; however, a display station opera­
tor cannot run the security utility pro­
grams.
Password security is an effective control 
only if display stations are signed off when 
unattended.
Menu—Transactions that are available 
for execution are identified in a menu dis­
play.
A security officer assigns menu restric­
tion based on user ID. When a specific user 
signs on, the authorized menu will automati­
cally appear. The operator may be restricted 
to executing only those functions established 
in the menu. Menu security is effective only 
when password controls are maintained.
Resource—Resource security can be 
used to prevent access to files and libraries 
if password security is active. The resource 
security file contains a record for each pro­
tected file and library, the user IDs of the 
authorized users of the file or library, and an 
access code that identifies the user cate­
gory. Security violations are logged to the 
system console and recorded in the system 
history area. Resource security is an effec­
tive control only if work stations are signed 
off when unattended.
The level of authority a user has over a 
file or library can be limited to any of the 
following access codes.
•  Owner. Can grant file access to others; 
rename the file or library; read, display, 
and change information in the file or 
library; or delete the file or library. The 
owner of a file or library can be any oper­
ator who is authorized to sign on to the 
system.
•  Change. Can read, display, delete, or 
change the contents of the file or library.
•  Read. Can read or display the information 
in the file or library but cannot change its 
contents.
•  Execute. (Applies to libraries only.) Can 
only execute library contents.
Listed below are some questions that 
relate to the effectiveness of system software 
access controls.
•  Has security been established during sys­
tem configuration?
•  Is a master security officer and an alter­
nate (in case of sickness or accident) as­
signed? Who are the security officers?
•  Are IDs and passwords changed fre­
quently?
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•  Are authorized users maintaining the se­
crecy of their IDs and passwords?
•  Are programmers restricted from access 
to all data files?
•  Are system operators and display station 
operators restricted from changing the 
contents of all libraries?
•  Is the menu restriction applied properly, or 
do display station operators have com­
mand capability?
•  Who has access to the system support 
program and utilities?
•  Are work stations left unattended while 
signed on? (Users should be required to 
use the off command when leaving a work 
station.)
•  Are the system support program diskettes 
and their backup copies in a secure 
place? Who has access to them?
•  Are the backup diskettes containing the 
password and resource security files in a 
safe place? Who has access to them?
•  Are terminated employees immediately de­
leted from the security system?
In te ra c t iv e  C o m m u n ic a tio n  F e a tu re . Inter­
active communication feature is an optional 
component of the system support program that 
allows users on remote System/34s to interact 
with the application programs and the data 
bases of other intelligent devices. In addition, 
application programs in another system can 
activate programs on the remote System/34s. 
This guideline does not address the distributed 
processing environment.
B a c k u p . Backup procedures protect 
against the loss of data files and programs.
The two commands for backup are save and 
restore. The save command transfers disk 
files to diskettes in a condensed format 
readable only by the System/34 restore com­
mand. (There are other system commands 
that will copy files onto diskettes in a stand­
ard interchange format.) If files are copied in 
the standard interchange format, they can 
be manipulated through the use of data en­
try devices.8
Whenever the save command is invoked, a 
retention date is recorded on the diskette. The 
insertion of all 9s in the date field makes the
diskette file permanent so that a warning is 
given if an attempt is made to delete the file.
Utilities. Utilities are computer programs writ­
ten and provided by the hardware manufac­
turer that enable the user of the system to 
perform a variety of functions. The following 
utilities are provided on the System/34: data file 
utility, sort utility, source entry utility, screen 
design aid, work station utility, and patch pro­
cedure.
D a ta  F ile  U tility . A data file utility (DFU) is a 
utility program that provides the user with the 
ability to create, maintain, display, query, and 
print data files.9 The four distinct functions of a 
DFU are the
•  Enter function. Used to create indexed or 
direct access files.
•  Update function. Used to maintain and add 
to existing indexed or direct files and to 
maintain existing records in sequential files.
•  Inquiry function. Used to locate and display 
a specific record in indexed, sequential, or 
direct files.
•  List function. Used to print sorted or 
unsorted reports.
A DFU can select detail records from re­
lated master files. It can also select records 
based on a field value of E Q  (equal to), N E  
(not equal to), G T  (greater than), L T  (less than), 
G E  (greater than or equal to), or LE  (less than 
or equal to) a predefined value. Up to ten ac­
cumulator fields, five control breaks (group to­
tals), and twenty-four result fields are available.
A DFU can be used by the auditor to 
achieve limited but very useful audit proce­
dures, such as footing a file, comparing the 
content of two files, or testing the accuracy of 
data. The section of the appendix entitled 
"Using DFU as an Audit Tool” shows how a 
DFU can be used as a computer-assisted audit 
technique.
The existence of a DFU may result in 
weaknesses in internal control. A DFU is 
easy to use since it does not require pro­
gramming skills and allows the user to add, 
change, or delete records in a file without 
leaving an audit trail. Here are some tech­
niques for preventing the unauthorized use 
of a DFU.10
•  Create a separate library for the DFU and
8See “Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users” in this guideline.
9See “Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users” in this guideline.
10See “Utility Programs” in this guideline.
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restrict access to the library through re­
source security.
•  Remove the enter and update modules 
from the system. Changes to files should 
occur through application programs only.
S o rt U tility . The sort program provides se­
lection and sorting capability based on record 
codes or field contents. The input needed to 
process a sort program includes the OCL 
statements, sort fields, sequence (ascending or 
descending), and the input file name to be 
sorted. The output is the sorted file. The sort 
program has an option to print messages on 
the printer or on the display screen. These 
messages are issued during the generation 
phase of the sort program and include
•  The number of records in the input file.
•  The number of records in the sorted output 
file.
These totals may be used as run-to-run 
controls over the processing of data.11
S o u rc e  E n try  U tility . A source entry utility 
(SEU) can be used to create and maintain OCL 
procedures, RPG II, BASIC, COBOL, FOR­
TRAN IV, and assembler source statements; it 
can also be used to sort statements and work 
station utility statements. An SEU allows the 
user to enter and update in free-form state­
ments that do not have a constant or rigid 
format, such as source code comments.12 
Some of the features of an SEU include provi­
sion for on-line developing and changing of 
programs and OCL procedures, interactive 
syntax checking and developing, and modify­
ing of display station edit routines.
This utility is generally used by pro­
grammers to create and maintain programs.
If the use of an SEU is not controlled, the 
integrity of production programs may be im­
paired. Listed below are some techniques to 
control the use of an SEU.13
•  Provide password and resource security
over production programs and OCL pro­
cedure library and data files,
•  Remove source programs from the system 
except when they are needed for modifi­
cation.
•  Use program test libraries for program de­
velopment.
•  Remove the SEU from the system except 
when needed to perform authorized func­
tions.
•  Maintain object programs in libraries sepa­
rate from source programs.
•  Create a separate library for the SEU and 
restrict access to that library through re­
source security.
An SEU could be used by the auditor to 
review source code logic and OCL proce­
dures.14 A function of the SEU that could be 
helpful to the auditor is the scan feature, 
which allows the user to scan programs or 
procedures for a specific string of charac­
ters, such as a field name. The system will 
display all source statements containing the 
specified string of characters so the instruc­
tions that affect key data fields can be iden­
tified and reviewed.
S c re e n  D e s ig n  A id . Screen design aids 
provide an interactive approach to designing, 
creating, displaying, and maintaining screen 
formats. One of the primary uses of a screen 
design aid is to develop menus.15
W ork  S ta tio n  U tility . A work station utility 
provides features such as self-checking dig­
its, alpha-numeric edit, and completeness of 
data checks to incorporate controls in the 
data entry programs.16
P a tc h  P ro c e d u re . This procedure displays 
selected disk or diskette sectors and allows the 
user to modify the data in those sectors. The 
user can modify disk or diskette information by 
replacing data displayed on the display screen 
with the new data. The patch procedure can 
be executed only from the system console.
The patch procedure is not restricted by 
resource security. The existence of a patch 
may result in weaknesses in internal control
11See “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users,” “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Within 
the EDP Department," and “ Utility Programs” in this guideline.
12See “ Documentation” in this guideline.
13See “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Within the EDP Department” in this guideline.
14See "Documentation" in this guideline.
15See “ Documentation” in this guideline.
16See “Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users” in this guideline.
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because its use leaves no evidence.17 How­
ever, there are techniques for preventing the 
unauthorized use of a patch:
•  Remove the patch program from the 
system.
•  Establish the patch procedure in a sepa­
rate library and restrict accesses 
through resource security.
Compilers and Linkage Editor. Compilers are 
programs provided by the manufacturer which 
are used to convert source language state­
ments into machine-executable form. Before 
they can be executed, the compiled programs
must be assigned relative memory addresses 
by a program known as the overlay linkage 
editor.
Because compilers and the linkage edi­
tor can be used to make unauthorized modi­
fications to production programs, access to 
compilers and linkage editors should be 
controlled.18 To control access
•  Remove the compilers and linkage editor 
from the system and store in a secure 
location.
•  Use password and resource security over 
libraries.
•  Restrict access to programs and system 
documentation.
Using a DFU as an Audit Tool
To illustrate the use of a data file utility (DFU) 
as a computer-assisted audit technique, this 
section presents an audit environment, the 
sample audit objectives, and the approaches 
using DFU specifications that are required to 
accomplish these objectives. The following in­
formation is required to use a DFU as an audit 
tool:
•  The files on which the audit tests are to be 
performed. These files must be on line at the 
time the DFU is used and must be refer­
enced by file name.
•  The RPG II input source specifications for all 
fields to be used in the DFU application. If 
these do not exist in the source program 
library, they may be created through the 
source entry utility (SEU).
•  The name of the library in which the source 
specifications are stored.
Audit Environment. The company is a retail 
electric supplier which uses a System/34 to 
process perpetual inventory. The inventory 
consists of a large volume of low-value items. 
The contents of the inventory file are described 
in exhibit A on page 25.
The inventory audit procedures in the past 
were performed manually and included the fol­
lowing steps:
1. Footing the computer-generated inventory 
status report (approximately 9,000 items).
2. Testing extensions on the inventory status 
report.
3. Selecting items for test counts and price 
tests.
4. Completing test counts and price tests, 
comparing data with the inventory status re­
port, and documenting results.
A u d it  P ro c e d u re  O ne. Extend and foot the 
inventory file and generate a summary report in 
class sequence showing total cost.
D F U  A p p ro a c h . Use the list, sort, accumu­
late, and arithmetic facilities of the DFU. Exhibit 
B (on pages 26-30) shows the display screens 
used to define the DFU specifications. The re­
port generated appears in exhibit C on page 
31.
A u d it P ro c e d u re  Two. Select and print all 
items having an average cost per item greater 
than $1.00 or a quantity on hand greater than 
5,000.
D F U  A p p ro a c h . Use the list, sort, accumu­
late, and select facilities of the DFU. The report 
generated appears in exhibit D on page 32.
A u d it P ro c e d u re  Three. Print a report iden­
tifying differences between current costs con­
tained on the inventory master file and current 
costs documented on recent invoices.
D F U  A p p ro a c h . Use all features of the 
DFU. The data entry feature is used to create a 
file containing costs, as taken from invoices. 
The master file feature is used to compare the
17See “ Lack of Segregation of Functions Between the EDP Department and Users" and “ Lack of Segregation of Functions
Within the EDP Department" in this guideline.
18See “Lack of Segregation of Functions Within the EDP Department" in this guideline.
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costs on both files. Exhibit E (on page 33) 
shows the report that results.
Based upon the availability of information 
contained in the inventory master file, these 
audit procedures could be performed using the 
DFU.
Creation of a DFU Application. The user must 
identify the DFU functions to be used. For ex­
ample, the user would key in “List” on the
display station, and the system would provide 
all the necessary screens for generating a DFU 
application. The display screens for audit pro­
cedure one are presented on pages 26-30. 
Input required from the user is highlighted in a 
box. At the end of the screen displays, a sam­
ple report is presented. For the purposes of 
this document, a small sample of the total in­
ventory file is used, and sample reports are 
presented for audit procedures two and three.
24
EXHIBIT A
25
EXHIBIT B
Input the name of the file, the name of the RPG II source member where the input specs are 
stored, and the library where they are stored. Specify if the file is to be sorted. Also, if this 
application is to be saved for future use, provide the necessary information.
Select the type of report to be generated. Specify the title and spacing required on the report.
26
EXHIBIT B (c o n tin u e d )
The RPG II input source specs from the source program specified on the first screen are 
shown. Select the record type to be processed.
Select the fields to be presented on the report in the order they are to be presented. Define 
the heading name if different from the field name and specify if the field is to be accumu­
lated.
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EXHIBIT B (c o n tin u e d )
A plus under “Field” indicates a result field and will cause the next screen to be shown.
Describe the result field. In this example, the result is 9 digits in length with 2 decimal places. 
The result is quantity on hand times average cost.
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EXHIBIT B (c o n tin u e d )
Since “Sort” was selected on the first screen, define how the file is to be sorted. In this 
example, the file is sorted by item number within class.
On the data field specification screen (see p. 28), the result field—“Total Cost”—is to be 
accumulated. Specify here if interim totals are presented. In this example, present totals after 
each class.
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EXHIBIT B (c o n tin u e d )
Select specific records for processing. In this example, process all records in the file.
Final screen displaying all DFU specifications defined on previous screens.
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EXHIBIT C
31
EXHIBIT D
32
EXHIBIT E
33
EXHIBIT F
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